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Coercing Consensus:
Unintended success of the Octopus electronic payment system
For PISTA 2008
Dr Lucia Leung-Sea SIU (Lssiu@Ln.edu.hk)
Department of Sociology and Social Policy, Lingnan University
Hong Kong, China
ABSTRACT

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper contrasts the success and failure of two
electronic payment systems in Hong Kong, Octopus and
Mondex, during 1996-2002. The case illustrates the new
properties of electronic currencies, and provides insights for
product designers and regulators. Mondex was endowed
with the full legal status of money, launched by a mammoth
banking group, with Mondex cards given away for free to
consumers. Yet the Mondex system went into oblivion
within five years. Octopus started as a modest stored value
transport ticket that required a deposit. It ended up as a citywide multipurpose payment card used by 95% of the adult
population. The system has saved significant transaction
costs from the handling of coins, generating heavy
transactions and turnover volume.

In the world of plastic payment, credit cards and debit cards
are the two major categories that have attained mature
development. Each has developed its own system of
verification, settlement and security, spanning a globalized
hierarchical framework of trust and settlement [19].
However, demands for an electronic payment tool suitable
for small payments in the range of US$0.5 - US$10 remain
largely unfulfilled in most parts of the world. For every day
applications such as buying a coffee, a morning newspaper,
paying for a bus ride, or feeding a parking meter, both
merchants and consumers find it cumbersome to handle
exact change in coins. Yet the transaction costs of credit
cards and debit cards are formidable for these applications.
It will also look outrageous if a passenger has to provide a
signature, a fingerprint, or key in a chip-and-pin device in
order to get onto a bus.

The success of Octopus and the failure of Mondex cannot
be explained by marketing strategies or technical merits
alone. The two systems sought to overcome user resistance
in different approaches: Mondex relied on voluntary uptake,
but Octopus imposed a compulsory switch upon a large
base of commuters. The case shows that in electronic
currencies, large merchants and technology platforms are
now in a better position to negotiate for what is valid money
and what is not. Mondex, a legitimate and trustworthy
source of money supply from the banking industry, failed to
diffuse across the public. Meanwhile a large merchant
group equipped with the point-of-sale device was able to
define a new value token for the public. By controlling the
material interface of electronic payment, the merchant side
is playing a more active role in the loop of social consensus
of money. 1
Keywords: Octopus, Mondex, electronic payment systems,
consensus, electronic currency, digital cash, smart cards.
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Mondex and Octopus were two electronic payment projects
aiming at small payments. Both projects started in Hong
Kong in the mid 1990s, originating from different sectors.
Mondex from the banking sector ended in failure, but
Octopus from the transport sector (1997) became a
remarkable innovation and success, which was widely
referenced in the smart card industry. Octopus was a
contactless payment card based on radio frequency
identification
(RFID)
technology.
No
personal
identification was held in the card, and the read/write
process could be finished within 0.3 seconds. (See Table 3
for more technical specifications.)
In the past decade, contactless smart card solutions emerged
in many cities around the world. Examples included
MetroCard in New York (1997); Chicago Card (1999);
EasyRider in Nottingham (2000); EZ-Link in Singapore
(2001); Calypso in Paris (2001); Andante in Porto, Portugal
(2002); Nagasaki SmartCard in Japan (2002); EasyCard in
Taipei (2002); OysterCard in London (2003); Beijing
Municipal Administration and Communications Card in
Beijing (2003); SmarTrip in Washington DC (2004);
LisbaoViva in Lisbon (2004); Breeze card in Atlanta (2006);
ChalieCard in Boston (2006); Transcard in Shenzhen
(2006); and Flexus in Oslo (2008). This list is schematic
rather than exhaustive. The projects differed widely in
terms of their degrees of success, showing that developers

of smart card payment solutions had to face uncertainties
and contingent local factors.
In this paper I will provide a comparative account of the
dramatic history of Mondex and Octopus, two electronic
payment systems in Hong Kong in 1996-2002. Then the
paper will explore the success of Octopus and the failure of
Mondex from five dimensions: social consensus, network
effect, “killer application”, precursor products, and pointof-sales (POS) materiality.
2. A TALE OF TWO MONEYS
Mondex was an “electronic wallet” that stores monetary
value on a microchip. It used to be a joint venture between
banking conglomerate HSBC and MasterCard International.
At the height of the project, Mondex cards were issued in
over ten countries. Users could load monetary value from
automatic teller machines to their Mondex cards, and spend
money at retail merchant counters.
In Hong Kong, the project was launched in Oct 1996 by
HSBC and Hang Seng Bank, both being large banks under
the HSBC group. The two banks jointly occupied one-third
of the city’s banking deposits. At the Mondex launching
ceremony in 1996, an executive from HSBC said he wished
that Mondex could replace a substantial part of their cash
stock in ten years’ time. A trendy and bright image was
quickly built up. With visible marketing efforts, colourful
pamphlets and commercials were spread around town.
The annual charge of Mondex cards (HK$100) was
waivered, such that account clients of the two banks
actually got it for free. The project started out in two
middle-class residential shopping malls, and was extended
to three retail chains (Fortress, Watson’s and Park’n Shop),
a university campus, and public sports facilities. Merchants
and service providers were installed with Mondex readers at
checkout counters.
Mondex was never made compulsory. It was an option
additional to cash, credit cards and debit cards. In general,
users and merchants did not see any obvious benefits in
switching to Mondex. Eight months after the launching
ceremony, I tried to use my Mondex card in a drugstore in
Cityplaza, one of the pilot shopping malls. The cashier
frowned, knelt on the floor to search for the card reader
underneath, and spent five minutes to operate it. She
apologized for being unfamiliar with this device. “No one
uses it. I have never seen a Mondex card for months.” After
my transaction, a dozen of irritated customers were already
lining up behind me.
In fact Mondex never really took off in Hong Kong.
Starting from 1999, HSBC and Hang Seng Bank adopted a
more low-key position to this product, and seldom did any
further marketing. Later on HSBC sold out all shares of
Mondex to Mastercard International. Meanwhile, Mondex
moved on to launch a new project in Taiwan [34]. In April

2002 the Mondex project was formally terminated in Hong
Kong [25]. The product was totally wiped out, but Eric Tai,
the former project director of Mondex, became the CEO of
Octopus in 2002-06 [10].
Octopus (former company name: Creative Star) was a joint
venture between five public transport companies to develop
a stored value transport card. The contactless feature was
state-of-the-art technology in 1997, which enabled users to
swing a whole handbag near the card reader and pay the
exact fare. It was extremely quick and convenient for
passengers in a hurry. The card could be reloaded at
transport stations, where users feed banknotes into add
value machines.
The Octopus card was meant to replace the magnetic stored
value ticket of the Mass Transit Railway (MTR), which was
used for more than ten years. When Octopus was
introduced, the MTR and the then Kowloon-Canton
Railway (KCR) made all passengers replace their common
stored value tickets into Octopus; otherwise their old tickets
would be made obsolete in 2-3 months. The only alternative
was a single journey ticket, the fare of which was higher
and it had to be bought with coins and banknotes. 2 The
public quickly switched to the new Octopus card. Within
the first three months, 3 million cards were sold out [30].
While Creative Star urged card manufacturer Sony to
replenish new cards, there was a temporary shortage.
There was widespread resentment of the HK$50 deposit
taken for an Octopus card, and the loss of the previous “last
ride discount” available to users of the magnetic tickets.
Some elderly groups and political parties from Tuen Mun, a
district with a high ratio of the lower income groups,
protested against the Light Rail Transit (LRT) for adding
financial burden to the poor. In return, the LRT offered the
elderly a discount for a short period.
User resistance only lasted for the first few months.
Afterwards there was not much news from Octopus. The
public got used to the new card and enjoyed the
convenience it brought. Transaction volume and the number
of cards issued increased steadily, and the system was
extended to more than 15 transport applications. Auxiliary
applications included photo booths in MTR stations and
parking meters [9].
In the early stage, the community rarely perceived Octopus
as a form of cash. The spotlight of local press reports was
on the “war of standards” between Mondex and VisaCash,
but Octopus was not seen as a direct competitor. The
Economist in 1998 lamented the apathy shown towards
electronic cash, without taking into account the high
transaction volume of Octopus.
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Passengers using Octopus enjoyed a 10% fare discount.

Table 1: Background of the two electronic payment systems
Mondex
Octopus
Founding
members
Local market
share

System cost
Issuer

Financial sector
HSBC, Hang Seng Bank, Mastercard
International
HSBC issues 64.4% of Hong Kong’s
currency (2002) [14]
HSBC and Hang Seng deposit 32.5% of
Hong Kong’s M2 money supply (2001) 3
Information unavailable
Licensed banks

Transport sector
Creative Star – joint venture between
five transport companies
Mass Transit Railway (MTR): 11
million passenger journeys per day
(total population was 6 million)
US$53 million
Authorized deposit-taking organization
(2000)

Table 2: Outcome of user acceptance
Mondex
Cards issued

No. of
merchants
Daily
transactions
Profit
Outcome

Pilot phase, trial quantity (1996)
0.19 million (Nov 1998) [6]
Below 0.1 million (Feb 2002) [13]
8000 [6]
Most are retail shops
Not disclosed

Never attained profit
User resistance
Low usage
HSBC sold out all shares
Hong Kong project terminated (2002) [1]

Octopus

Pilot phase, trial quantity (1997)
4.6 million (Nov 1998)
9 million (Feb 2002) [21]
17 million (Jun 2008)
120 (2002) [21]
Most were conglomerate chains
Over 2000 (Jun 2008)
Over 7 million (Feb 2002) [21]
Over 10 million, turnover HK$85
million (Jun 2008)
HK$18 million (2000) [20]
City-wide acceptance
High regular turnover
HKMA released previous 15%
restriction on non-transport purposes
(2000) [21]

Table 3: Comparison on technical and marketing merits
Mondex
Octopus
User cost
Legal Status
Launching time
Privacy concern

(+) Free (HK$100 fee waivered)
(+) Full legal status of money
(+) Oct 1996
(-) Holds personal information, linked to
bank account

Contact mode
Speed

(-) Need contact to read/write
(-) Read/write time: 5 seconds
Date transmission: 9.6 kbit/s
MULTOS chip
Patented issuance and update mechanism:
STEP (Secure Trusted Environment
Provisioning)
Verification and encryption: KMA (key
management authority)

Specifications

(+) Merit
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(-) HK$50 deposit (US$6.41)
(-) Limited legal status / area of use
(-) Sep 1997
(+) Contains no personal info
(Later on optional varieties linked up with
bank accounts and award programs)
(+) Contactless read/write
(+) Read/write time: 0.3 seconds
Data transmission: 212 kbit/s
Sony 13.56 MHz RFID (FeliCa radio
frequency identification) chip
Proprietary standard predating the ISO/IEC
14443 standard
ERG (Australian) as system integrator
PKI (public key infrastructure) encryption
Two-way authentication

(-) Disadvantage

The total deposit of HSBC Hong Kong was HK$722,285 million; the total deposit of Hang Seng Bank Hong Kong was HK$414,328
million [16]. From the HKMA online resource centre, Hong Kong’s M2 money supply in 2001 was HK$3,501 billion.

“Even the people of Hong Kong and Singapore – notorious
technophiles and shoppers – seem unenthusiastic… the total
volume of cashless transactions in Hong Kong is still
estimated at less than $10m a year – just $30 for each user.”
“Keep the Change”, the Economist, 19 Nov 1998
In fact in November 1998, Octopus had quietly reached a
daily transaction volume over HK$20 million [11],
equivalent to US$203 per Octopus user in a year.
In 2000, Octopus jumped on to non-transport purposes such
as convenience stores, school tuck shops, self-serviced
photocopy machines, and vending machines. Add value
points extended from transport stations to hundreds of
convenience stores. Octopus also cooperated with smaller
banks to launch the Octopus automatic add value service,
where a customer may link their Octopus to his/her credit
card for automatic reloading. The application was extended
to 21 banks and financial partners (including large ones) in
2008.
Response was very positive, for over 80% of the city’s
population already had an Octopus card in their pockets. In
transactions below HK$10 (US$1.28), especially in selfserviced machines where exact change was needed, people
were glad to get rid of their dimes and nickels. This move
towards non-transport purposes was made possible by the
monetary regulators. Possibly realizing the failures of
Mondex and VisaCash in Hong Kong, in 2000 the Hong
Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) issued a deposit-taking
company license to Octopus, relaxing the previous 15%
restriction from the percentage of turnover from nontransport purposes. After Mondex announced its withdrawal
from Hong Kong in 2002, the outcome of user acceptance
was clear. A summary of user response is given in Table 2,
and the two systems are compared for their marketing and
technical conditions in Table 3.
3. SOCIAL CONSENSUS
What makes a form of token valid money? For regulators
and the banking sector, the answer usually includes the
backing of a sound issuing bank, public trust towards state
and monetary authorities, the intricate control of currency
supply, and measures to prevent counterfeits. Banknotes
and coins are issued from a single source of legitimacy
through national mints or authorized issuing banks. Cash
enters the market through authorized banks, and then
circulates around a transaction network made up by banks,
merchants and consumers.
The case of Mondex and Octopus in 1996-2001 was
intriguing to the regulators. The Hong Kong Monetary
Authority [13] found that citizens refused to use Mondex, a
form of legal tender prepared by a full-status issuing bank.
Instead they chose to use Octopus, a stored value card
initiated from the merchant side alone. Transactions were so

successful that the Octopus company was in a good position
to negotiate with the regulators, who decided to upgrade the
status of Octopus from that of single-purpose stored value
card to multi-purpose stored value card. The approval was
granted in 2000 on the grounds of promoting innovation.
However, research reports from the HKMA [13][15] raised
a remaining concern: how should regulators respond to the
popularity of a payment token produced by a non-bank
organization? Does the case of Octopus suggest that the rise
of electronic currencies may lead to “erosion of seignorage”?
From a sociological perspective, money works by social
consensus [3][24] - a shared awareness that “everybody
else” in the exchange community will also accept the same
token at equivalent value. John and Mary recognise the
value of a US$10 banknote, because they know that others
in the economy also recognise the same thing. What matters
is not the material worth of the token’s constituent ink,
paper, metal or plastic. What makes money work is the
shared consensus that others will also accept the same token.
In classical banknotes, such consensus is largely based upon
the issuer’s guarantee that the token bearer will be paid in
full, and the public’s trust in this guarantee. Consensus is
mutually reinforced in a feedback loop [3], supported by the
legitimacy and trustworthiness of the originating source of
supply.
Yet in the case of Mondex and Octopus, a currency with
superior legitimacy and trustworthiness (from a classical
banking point of view) failed to establish this social
consensus, while Octopus succeeded. Technological and
sociological factors were playing an important role here.
4. NETWORK EFFECT
Technological products are extremely sensitive to the initial
size of their user base. There are at least three reasons why
a large enough user base needs to be established in an early
phase: network effect [17], path-dependent lock-in [2] [18],
and economy of scale. Network effect means that the value
of a product or service depends on how many people are
already using it. Take the telephone network as an example.
A standalone phone is useless, and two phones connected
by a wire is only an intercom. Yet as the number of
subscribers increases, each new subscriber becomes a
potential node of communication, incrementally turning the
telephone system into a powerful communication network.
In the case of Mondex and Octopus, adoption of the
payment tool is a two-side scenario between merchants and
consumers. If a large number of consumers are already
using the payment card, it becomes more attractive for a
new merchant to accept payment from it; vice versa if more
merchants are already accepting payment from it, the more
attractive it will appear for a new consumer to put the
payment card in his/her purse. Once an initial user base is
captured, the system will be continually tested, improved
and extended. The setup and operation cost for the payment

card, point-of-sale (POS) equipment and backend networks
can also be reduced by economy of scale. A determinant
factor between success and failure is whether the payment
card can capture a large enough regular user base, and
capture it quick enough. In the case of Octopus, the
successful capture of an initial user base leads to a benign
cycle of growth and development. In the case of Mondex,
failure to do so leads to a vicious cycle of apathy and
resistance. This may look straightforward with hindsight,
but readers are reminded that product innovation is an
uncertain process; it is difficult to predict the pattern of user
response during planning and design stage.
5. KILLER APPLICATION
The two systems took very different approaches to capture
their initial user base. Mondex took a “democratic”
approach. It reached out to merchants by negotiated
partnerships and to consumers by incentive programs. The
use of Mondex was on voluntary basis, and the Mondex
program seemed to underestimate the inertia of existing
payment habits. Amongst 8,000 heterogeneous retail shops,
the incentive program was lack of focus. It could hardly
differentiate from other shopping discounts, and consumers
did not see a vital need to switch to Mondex.
Octopus took a “coercive” approach. From the beginning it
only focused on five merchants in public transport. Out of
the five companies, a compulsory switch was imposed by
the two railway systems. Regular commuters on the two
metro systems found no alternatives but to switch to
Octopus - single journey tickets and other public transport
were far from ideal substitutes. It could be argued that the
two railway companies were, to some extent, manipulating
their monopolistic position in an enclosed public utility,
leaving little choices for consumers but to start using
Octopus. Nevertheless, such a coercive approach proved to
be effective in overcoming user resistance [8], changing
user habits, and bringing benefits to both the transport and
consumer sectors.
Octopus managed to capture a large initial user base
because of its distinctive “killer application”: as stored
value ticket for passengers of the MTR and KCR. In
computer science, the term “killer application” refers to
remarkably successful application programs such as the
spreadsheet program Visicalc on Apple II, Lotus 1-2-3 on
IBM personal computers, desktop publishing software
Pagemaker on Macintosh, and the game Star Raiders on the
early Atari game platform [5]. The applications were so
successful (or essential) that users were willing to take up a
new technical platform for the sake of the application.
Unfortunately for Mondex, its fate was partly sealed by the
absence of such applications.
6. PRECURSOR PRODUCTS
For metro passengers in Hong Kong, Octopus was
presented as the next-generation ticket after the magnetic

stored value ticket, which had been widely adopted for over
ten years. The presence of a precursor product helped
passengers to get used to a stored value cash card in their
purse and to lower user resistance. Meanwhile, the decision
to discontinue the magnetic cards altogether removed any
competition from them.
On the contrary, Mondex was facing competition from a
well-established mix of existing payment tools, namely
cash, debit cards and credit cards. It was impossible for
retailers to cease using them without harming business.
Seemingly Mondex did not possess clear advantages to
“squeeze its way through” at payment counters. It could be
argued that the genuine competition faced by Mondex came
from cash, debit cards and credit cards instead of Octopus.
7. POINT-OF-SALES MATERIALITY
In the circulation of money, it should be noted that smart
card payment systems are introducing a new component,
the point-of-sale (POS) interface into the money circuit. In
the exchange of traditional cash, economic value is
embodied by a piece of paper or metal, where receivers
usually accept the token with bare hands. Standardization
was controlled by the regulator and the issuing bank.
With the arrival of the POS device, large merchants are now
equipped with a new filter to decide what is valid money
and what is not. If the money token does not pass through
the POS device, it is unusable despite whatever authority
and legitimacy it carries. For large merchants in possession
of a unique public utility, such as the MTR and the KCR,
they can now take part in negotiating the standard of valid
money by controlling access and technical compatibility.
When passengers pass through the MTR turnstiles on a
daily basis, the mesmerising beep of Octopus and the
smooth access to escalators, trains and stations give users a
form of trust different from that of an issuing bank. The
railway companies did not have the legal status of banks,
but the railway infrastructure could serve as an alternative
form of guarantee. From a social point of view, the card is
useful and it works in the passenger’s daily life. This is
especially true for a dense city heavily relying on the metro
as its major form of transport. Some Hong Kong people
even relate their cultural identity to Octopus, as shown in
the Facebook group “‘Doot’ [beep] through life with that
Octopus card” with over 11,000 members in June 2008.
8. CONCLUSION
The history of Octopus and Mondex is a strong case to
illustrate the dual properties of electronic currencies: they
are moneys as well as technological artefacts. When
developing a new product, it is important that product
designers, marketing personnel, and regulators take both
monetary and technological aspects into considerations.

Success factors of Octopus include a densely populated city,
an essential public utility, presence of a precursor product
(“ticket”), social trust from daily material contact, a
compulsory switch, and the absence of perfect substitutes.
The payment system was adopted widely and rapidly across
the population.
The case also carries implications for regulators, as
materiality factor at the POS is bringing changes to the
social consensus of money. Solomon [28] suggests that
when money goes electronic, merchants, technology firms
and telecom corporations will play a more active role in
finance. The tension between banks and non-banks,
regulation for non-banks, and economic stability will pose
new challenges to regulators. In the case of Octopus, the
HKMA had attempted to balance between financial stability
and not to stifle non-bank innovations [13]. The outcome to
the local economy was a healthy one. In the future, money
regulators and banks can expect more partnerships,
negotiations and competition to arise from non-bank
organizations.
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